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SMALL BUSINESS BEFORE THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
One of the most persistent criticisms of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion' concerns its antitrust activities against small businesses.2 This
criticism has issued from Congress, 4 courts,5 independent commissions,6
and persons both within and without the Commission itself.7 Small
firms are more often pursued by the Commission, the critics allege,
because the Commission fears the political consequences of proceeding
1. The FTC was created by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
2. The Commission has been subject to criticism on several other grounds. See, e.g.,
BERNsTEiN, REGULATiNC BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT CONMmssON 86, 104 (1955) (concerning
Commission's inflexible bureacracy). Contra, Kintner, The Federal Trade Commission in
1960-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, ANTITusr LAw Sswosiumw 21, 24-25 (1961); H.R. REP.
No. 5236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951); Hearings before the Subcommittee No. I of the
Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 84th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 1, at 214-15 (1956) (concerning inadequacies of Commission staff); contra, Elias,
Administrative Discretion-No Solution in Sight, 45 UALRQ. L. REv. 313, 332 (1962).
3. See, e.g., Books: HENDERSON, THE F .DERAL TRADE COs.NMsssoN 337 (1924) (charges the
Commission avoids major cases); RowE, PnxcE DiscasMtiNATIoN AND THE Ron.mSON PATMAN,
Acr 536 (1962) (charges the Commission seeks easy cases to build a record); Articles:
Rockefeller & Wald, Antitrust Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice: A Primer for Small Business, 66 Dicm. L REv. 251, 256 (1962)
(failure of parties to know their rights causes ill effects); Simon, The Case Against the
Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. Cm. L REv. 297, 320-26 (adverse effect on small firms
of policy decisions by Commission); contra, Wallace & Douglas, Antitrust Policies and the
New Attack on the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. CuL L. REv. 684 (1952); Herring,
Politics, Personalities, and the Federal Trade Commission, 28 Am. PoL. Sm. REv. 1016,
1020-21 (1934) (political pressures direct Commission to prosecution of small firms).
Congressional Comment: UNrrED STATES COMMSSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcu-
mu BRANCH OF THE GovERN,%rENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMiLSiONs 122,
127, 128 (1949) (charges the Commission has its major effect on small firms); AD.NUNIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CotMITrEE ON INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND
PROCEDURES OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 21 (1962) (claims the Commission has
little effect on national economic problems); H.. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 17
(1951) (claims the Commission fails to select cases properly).
For statistical evidence showing a definite trend in FTC activities towards prosecutions
of small businesses, see STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COmmrr ON SmAvl. BusiLEss, 84TH CONG.,
1sr SEss., REPORT ON ANTrr'uST CoMPrANrs (Comm. Print 1956) 2.
4. See, e.g., ibid; H.R. REP. No. 2238, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961).
5. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
6. See, e.g., ATrORNEY GENERAL'S CommrrEE ON ADMINISrRATm PROCEDURE, FNAL RE-
PORT (1941); PRESmFNT'S CoMmirrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE M ANAGESIENr (1937); U.%NED
STATES COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcum'E BRANcH OF THE GOvEI rExT,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SER ICES AND PnocEDmums (1955).
7. See, e.g., MASON, THE LANGUAGE oF DssFNT, 68, 85 (1959).
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against large firms8 and desires to build a good record by litigating
against firms less able to defend themselves.9 In response the Commis-
sion could deny the existence of any adverse effects upon small busi-
nesses, claim its inability to change these effects, or admit and justify
them on policy grounds. Whatever the appropriate response, the
Commission has never dealt with its critics in any systematic or con-
vincing way, perhaps out of a desire not to give credence to their
criticisms. But this silence seems unwise and improper. If the FTC can
disprove the factual basis of the criticism, it is impolitic not to do so.
If a policy decision has led the Commission to concentrate on small
business the decision should be made explicit so that Congress and
the courts can review the decision and so that small businesses can
accommodate themselves to the policy.
In order to assess the factual basis of the criticism the Journal
surveyed all the firms with which the FTC had reached settlement or
concluded litigation in antitrust cases from January, 1963 through June,
1965. The survey concentrated on three operations of the Commission,
(1) selection of cases, (2) investigation, and (3) pre-hearing settlement.
Of the approximately 500 firms questioned, 170 replied. Ninety-eight
questions were asked concerning the firm and its relations with the
Federal Trade Commission (the questionnaire itself is set forth in
Appendix A). Some possible defects in the survey should be noted.
The responses received may not represent a cross section of the firms
polled. Perhaps a disproportionate number of small firms answered.
Or perhaps only firms biased against the Commission responded. And,
factual inaccuracies, whether innocent or intentional, may have been
reported. Some of these possibilities could not be minimized. Since the
FTC provided no figures about the size of the firms which did not
answer, we could not be sure of the sample we received. 10 And, of
course, it is extremely difficult to detect inaccuracies, although question-
naires which were internally inconsistent or which seemed excessively
biased were excluded from the count. In spite of these possible difficul-
ties the survey seemed useful. It lends some support to the claims of
8. See House Hearings op. cit. supra (concerning charges that Goodyear Tire and
Rubber was not prosecuted by the Commission because the White House had packed the
Commission); Herring, Politics, Personalities and the Federal Trade Commission, 28 As:.
POL. Sci. REV. 1016, 1023-25 (1934).
9. Connor, FTC Procedure Revisions: A Critique, 7 ViLL. L. REv. 359, 861 (1962);
MASON, op. cit. supra note 7 at 305.
10. The Commission has some information on the cases it is concerned with as to
sales, assets, etc. This information, however, is not compiled in a readily usable form.
Letter to author from Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
Dec. 1, 1965, on file at office of Yale Law Journal.
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the Commission's critics; the responses revealed that the FTC may be
having a disproportionate impact on smaller firms and may be treating
them unfairly. If a more comprehensive study refutes the accuracy of
these conclusions, then, of course, the critics will be silenced. But only
the Commission has information or the means of obtaining information
enough to refute the possible inferences drawn from the data.
SELECTION OF CASES FOR INVESTIGATION
To choose cases for investigation the Commission relies very heavily"
on private letters of complaint. 2 These letters are informal, signed
charges that the complainant believes someone-usually a customer,
supplier or competitor-has committed an antitrust violation. 3 From
the large weekly batch of letters, which are encouraged by the Com-
mission's refusal to disclose the name of the complainant,14 "private
controversies"' 5 and obvious non-violations are eliminated. After this
step 16 the procedure for further selection rests upon an unclear
standard-the "public interest."'17
11. Cases for investigation can also arise through recommendations by the Commis-
sion's Bureau of Economics. 16 C.F.R. § 1.11 (Supp. 1965). See Dixon, Practice and Pro-
cedure before the Federal Trade Commission, 9 N.Y.LF. 31, 45-47 (1963). Suggestions for
subjects of study are made to the Bureau by Congress, the Executive, or other branches
of the Commission. See 1962 FTC ANN. REP. 75. These investigations have, at times,
significantly advanced national antitrust policy or led to other major legislation; for
example, the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1964) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77b-78hh (1964). See
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF TILE EXECUTIVE BPANC1 op. Cit. Su pra
note 3, at 123. But recent investigations demonstrate a tendency for the Bureau to be
primarily concerned with small business problems. For some of the less significant investi-
gations begun by the Bureau of Economics, such as ones of insignia manufacturers and
caldum arsenate manufacturers, see 1962 FTC ANN. REP. 138, 158. Other relatively minor
concerns have been, for example, the steel furniture industry-dividing $35,000,000 sales
between forty firms-and the machine embroidery industry-dividing $14,000,000 sales
between some 400 firms. H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sem., 88 (1951). For the
recent decline in the proportion of FTC resources devoted to the Bureau of Economics
compare 1930 FTC ANN. REP. 25 with 1964 FTC ANN. REP. 41.
12. 16 C.F.R. § 1.12 (Supp. 1965). Authority to issue rules arises from Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964).
13. 16 C.F.R § 1.12(a), (b) (Supp. 1965).
14. 16 C.F.R. § 1.12(d), 28 Fed. Reg. 7081 (1963). 1366 complaints were received in
1964. 1964 FTC ANN. REP. 19.
15. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13 (Supp. 1965).
16. The courts have given the Commission wide discretion in the selection of the
cases it wishes to prosecute. See, Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958); FTC v.
National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957).
17. Address by Philip Elman, Federal Trade Commissioner, before the Federal Bar
Assn., Sept. 11, 1964. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 US. 19 (1929); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co.,
258 U.S. 483 (1922).
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The survey indicated that a firm with gross sales of $2,000,000 or less
was twice as likely as a firm with gross sales of more than $2,000,000 to
send letters of complaint.1 8 Since firms in the former group constitute
more than 90% of the business units in the United States, these smaller
firms must account for a vast majority of complaints received by the
FTC.19 Further, at least two-thirds of the complaints lodged by firms
with less than $2,000,000 in gross sales are directed against other firms
of similar size.20 Inevitably, reliance on private letters of complaint
18. The question asked was "Have you ever written a letter to the Commission coin-
plaining of the activities of a supplier, competitor or customer?"
Quarter Yes No
1. s0 21 below $2,000,000
2. 24 If annual sales
S. 15 101 above $2,000,000
4. 11 19f annual sales
In the above table, and in subsequent tables contained in succeeding notes, the mmbers
on the left represent the firms answering the survey divided into quarters. Of all firms
responding, the smallest quarter in annual sales is subsumed under #1; of the responding
firms, the quarter with the next highest gross sales is subsumed under #2, and so on. The
annual sales dividing line between groups #2 and #3 is $2,000,000. The number of rc-
sponses in each quarter does not always equal the number in every other quarter. This
results from the fact that though the firms responding were broken down into four equal
groups not all firms in each group answered all the questions.
19. U.S. DEFT. oF TREAS., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1961-1962 U.S. BUSINESS TAX
REruRNs, 166, 178.
20. The question asked was "How many complaints have you written?"
Quarter None One Two or More
1. 2 6 10 1 below $2,000,000
2. 2 4 6 f annual sales
8. 9 4 0 1 above $2,000,000
4. 11 4 0 f annual sales
"What size was your competitor? Was the firm you complained about a direct com-
petitor of the same size as your firm? Considerably larger? Smaller?
Quarter Same Size Larger Smaller
1. 12 7 11 1 below $2,000,000
2. 10 9 10 f annual sales
8. 8 10 7 1 above $2,000,000
4. 8 10 6 f annual sales
Many firms, in a single letter of complaint, reported activities of more than one firm. As
a result, for example, the four complaints by the largest quarter of firms implicated twenty-
four individual firms.
See also, WILCOX, PUBLIC PoLIcIEs TowADs SMALL BUSINEss, 252 (1955).
[Vol. 75:487
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directs the Commission against a large number of smaller businesses. 2'
In fact, of the 170 reporting firms, all of which were objects of action
by the Commission, half had gross sales of $2,000,000 or less. These
small firms account for only 25% of total gross sales of all firms in the
United States.m Assuming that our figures can be extrapolated, and
that approximately half the firms before the Commission have gross
sales of less than $2,000,000, there is at least some support for the
complaint of the critics that the FTC is devoting too much time to the
investigation of these small firms and is having a disproportionate
impact upon them.
Several explanations might be advanced by the Commission to ac-
count for its concern with small firms: The Commission might allege
that small firms commit half of all antitrust violations and thus should
constitute half the caseload. Alternatively, the FTC could argue that
small firms take less time to prosecute, and therefore the Commission
is applying its resources efficiently by prosecuting a large number of
them. These justifications would be sound only if all antitrust viola-
tions, no matter what the size of the violator, were considered to be of
equal importance. This view of antitrust violations sees antitrust law
as a code of business ethics and disregards completely the impact of
the violation on the economy. But it is quite likely that this conception
of antitrust law is not shared by Congress or the courts.23
One important function of antitrust law is to promote efficient
allocation of resources in the economy.2 4 Even if this function is not
21. Baum, Antitrust Functions of the Federal Trade Commission: Area Discrimination
and Product Differentiation, 24 FED. B.J. 579 (1964). One firm recently prosecuted had
net assets of $16,000 and net profits of $460. STAr' RrPOrT op. cit. supra note 3, at 3, 17.
See Note, 38 IND. L.J. 577, 383 (1963).
22. U.S. DE.Pr. OF TREAs., INTERNAL REVEN E SE vicE, 1961-1962 U.S. Busumss TA-X
REruuRs, 166-78.
28. Of course, the Commission's function is, at least in part, to police immoral conduct.
The view of the Commission as a regulator of fair play and ethics is especially strong
in the fields of false labeling, e.g., the Flamable Products Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 111-15
(1953), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1964), and false advertising, Federal Trade Commission
Act, 52 Stat. 111-14 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-54 (1964). In dealing with these practices the
Commission need not concern itself with their impact on the national economy. Instead,
the Commission's role is to protect individual citizens. Since the injured citizen is the best
source of information, the letter of complaint procedure is an appropriate device for
aiding the Commission in its policeman's role.
But in the antitrust field, many hold the view that the Commission was meant to be
something other than a "policeman." In that field "the task of the Commission [was] not
to punish the wicked, but rather to. . . free competitive forces." Herring, supra note 3.
at 1016, 1019. It was meant to deal with industrial structure in a manner foreclosed to
the courts by the nature of the judicial process.
24. See, KAYSEN & TtRmN, ANTrmusr PoLicy 11-14 (1959).
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the only one, the Commission should not ignore it. The economic
impact of a particular antitrust violation should be considered when
the Commission decides to prosecute. Using this consideration the
Commission's present caseload could be justified only if small firms
committed many more violations or took much less time to prosecute
than larger firms. For example, a violation committed by a firm with
annual sales of $200,000,000 might have one hundred times the
economic impact of a similar violation committed by a firm with annual
sales of $2,000,000. The Commission could legitimately prosecute the
smaller firm only if the larger firm took more than one hundred times
as long to prosecute as the smaller firm, or if the smaller firm were one
hundred times more likely to commit the violation than the larger
firm.
If the present case distribution is inadvertent, the Commission should
correct itself by reviewing more closely the letters of complaint and
choosing subjects of Commission action according to their economic
impact. If, on the other hand, the Commission distributes its cases
consciously, and if Congress rejects one of the proffered rationales,
remedial legislation should be passed.25
The most effective way to restrain the Commission from convicting
a disproportionate number of small firms would be to establish a
minimum size (sales, income, assets, or some other measure) as a condi-
tion of the Commission's jurisdiction.26 This minimum would insure
that the firms and practices with which the Commission concerned itself
were important to the economy.- And perhaps the decreased number
25. There is another possible reason for the Commission's present distribution of
cases. Perhaps unique factual situations involving small firms provide the best oppor-
tunities for developing and clarifying the legal position of the Commission. If this is
the case the high incidence of small firms before the Commission would result front
legal strategy decisions rather than policy choices.
26. It is beyond the purpose of the note to suggest such an amount. Its exact level
is best set by experts. Such a change need not be politically impossible given the contintu-
ous criticism by Congress the Commission has undergone. See, Hous. SELtcr COI-rrrEE
ON SMALL BUSINESS, CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM, 1900-1956, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1956).
27. Such a jurisdictional limitation has been used to deal with the caseload of other
administrative agencies. The National Labor Relations Board adopted such a jurisdic-
tional minimum in 1954. The reasoning that motivated the National Labor Relations
Board to adopt a jurisdictional minimum is applicable to congressional supervision of the
FTC:
In making these modifications, we have given due consideration to all of the criteria
. . . including (1) the problem of bringing the caseload of the Board down to a
manageable size, (2) the desirability of reducing an extraordinarily large caseload In
order that we may give adequate attention to more important cases, (3) the relative
importance to the national economy of essentially local enterprises, as against those
[Vol. 75:487
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of individual complaints would create pressures within the Commission
to develop comprehensive studies which would help the FTC fulfill
its policy making role.28
An important criticism of the proposed legislation may be suggested.
A minimum jurisdictional requirement would remove a large number
of firms from the FTC's control. However, firms below the jurisdic-
tional minimum would not be left completely unregulated. Their
intrastate transactions would be subject to the regulation of state com-
missions which, in many respects, are similar to the FTC.-9 Moreover,
effective antitrust violation may cause a firm to grow enough to bring
it within the Commission's jurisdiction. And small firms which join
together to violate the antitrust laws could be treated together for
purposes of the jurisdictional amount.3 0
INVESTIGATION OF CASES
Following the selection of a case for investigation, FTC personnel
visit the party under investigation to ask preliminary questions and
to look at relevant documentsP If this visit does not yield all the
information the Commission desires, it can subpoena questionnaires,
documentary evidence, and testimony.3 But the courts have held that
having a truly substantial impact on our economy, and (4) overall budgeting policy
and limitations.
Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1954). Their decision was sub-equently
affirmed by the Supreme Court, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
Congress limited the Board's power to raise its jurisdictional minimum beyond the level
set in 1954, but did not seek to reverse the Board. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)
(1964).
Similar jurisdictional limits have been imposed by the Securities and Exchange Com.
mission. Securities and Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 75 (1933). 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958); I
FED. SEc. L. REP. 2359. See HEawrrz, CAsEs AND MATERIALs oN BustNESS PL, Naix., Part
I, 158 (Temp. ed. 1964). A final example is from the antitrust field. The Clayton Act has
a minimum jurisdictional amount in cases involving interlocking directorships. 38 Stat.
732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
28. Presumably, the Bureau of Economics would fill this role of developing compre-
hensive studies. See note 11, supra.
29. See 4 TRADn REG. REP. S 35002-40508. The pre-emption problem could be dealt
with by national legislation. It should be noted in addition that the Justice Department
would have jurisdiction in these areas, even if the Commission instituted a jurisdictional
minimum. For general problems of federal-state overlap jurisdiction in the antitrust field
see 1961 Antitrust Law Symposium, N.Y.S. BAR Ass'N, SECTIoN o. AN'rrRtusT 18-20; Mant-
zoros, Federal-State Antitrust Jurisdiction, 9 N.Y.L.F. 74 (1963).
30. Presumably this qualification would cover those firms engaging in illicit practices
which split off "independent" firms in order to remain outside the jurisdictional mini-
mum.
31. Dixon, Practice and Procedure before the Federal Trade Commission, 9 N.Y.LF.
31, 47 (1963).
32. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.34, 1-35, 1.37, 1.38, 1.39 (Supp. 1965).
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investigators must notify parties under investigation before they have
any obligation to give information.83 And subsequent to such notice
the investigators from the Commission may look only at relevant
documents. 34
The survey revealed, however, that FTC investigators have ignored
these limitations with a frequency that increases as the size of the firm
under investigation decreases.35 For example, for firms with gross sales
less than $2,000,000 the following pattern was not uncommon:80 on
several occasions the investigator either arrived at the firm after
normal business hours or went to an officer's home without prior
notice; often no specific charges were announced, or if announced,
they were addressed only to officers or employees, such as accountants
or secretaries, whose familiarity with the legal aspects of an investigation
was negligible; the investigator rarely mentioned that the firms had
33. As to the general protection afforded all corporations against unreasonable searches
and seizures etc. by any governmental branch or agency see United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (19-15);
Tractor Training Service v. FTC, 227 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1955).
34. See, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1945); FTC v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
35. For criticisms of FTC investigations see, Pollock, Precomplaint Investigations by
the Federal Trade Commission, 9 ANTmUsT BuLL. 1, 10, 14 (1964); Rockefeller and Wald,
supra note 3, at 257, 267; Connelly, The Commission's Power to Conduct Field Investiga.
tions, 14 A.B.A. ANTrrRusT SEcroN 18, 22 (1959).
36. The profile of Commission investigation procedures described here is a composite
of several questions asked in the survey. The questions asked were "What sorts of infor-
mation have they (investigators) asked for (when they came to the company offices)?"
Most small firms replied "all," "everything" or the like. Some other questions asked were
"How much advance warning (of the investigator's visit) did you have?"
A week
Quarter None 24 hours or more
1. 10 7 6 below $2,000,000
2. 11 4 6 annual sales
3. 2 1 17 above $2,000,000
4. 1 1 16 annual sales
"Did the notice tell you specifically what you were being investigated for and what In-
formation the FTC wanted from you?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 3 13) below $2,000,000
2. 3 151 annual sales
3. 9 3 above $2,000,000
4. 13 4 annual sales
[Vol. 75:487
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a right to wait for a subpoena. As a result the Commission gained access
to all files.
In contrast to the procedures used in investigating these firms, in
three quarters of the cases involving larger firms, the investigator
notified the firm's legal officer that he was interested in a particular
alleged offense and wanted to see specific documents; upon arrival the
investigator reported to the legal officer and requested information
which was usually limited to that which could be obtained by subpoena.
There is little indication that the treatment of small firms was inten-
tionally different from the treatment of other firms. Since many small
firms have no legal officer, it may be that investigators had to question
accountants and secretaries who could supply the necessary informa-
tion. And the request to look through all company files may have been
justified by the company's size or by its filing system.
Perhaps the Commission is unaware of the treatment accorded small
firms under investigation. If so, the Commission should adopt and
follow uniform investigative procedures. For example, investigators
should give adequate notice to all parties of the Commission's intent to
investigate. This notice should contain a description of the complaint
that has been filed against the party, a summary of the information
desired, and a statement that such information cannot be compelled
by the Commission without a subpoena. The adoption of this proce-
dure would insure that small firms would not be easier to prosecute
merely because they were unaware of their rights.37
Another aspect of the FTC's investigative procedures has an unduly
harmful effect on small firms. After the field investigation the Com-
mission may hold an investigative hearing. This hearing can relate to
any subject of interest to the FTC38 and need not be based upon a
specified complaint.-9 The hearing itself can cover all aspects of a
firm's finance and management,40 exposing information such as price
37. There is some precedent for such a requirement. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act now contains such provisions. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52
Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 67 Stat. 476 (1953), 21 U.S.C. § 374(a), (b) (1964). Their
addition to the original act was due in part to one Supreme Court decision finding fault
with the vague wording of the act, United States v. Cardiff, 344 US. 174 (1952), and to
abuses, such as have occurred by Commission inspectors seeking violations of the act.
1953 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2198. See United States v. Maryland Baking Co., 81
F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
38. 16 C.F.RL § 1.35(b) (Supp. 1965).
39. 16 C.F.P. § 1.35 (Supp. 1965).
40. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 US. 61 (1953); Claire Furnace Co. v. FTC.
274 U.S. 160 (1927); FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925
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lists, invoices, purchase orders, and dollar and unit sales figures.41
Although an investigated party has a right to hired counsel, 42 he is
given few other procedural safeguards.43 For example, the Commission
limits his right to challenge either specific questions or the general
scope of the hearing.44 Until 1961 these hearings were conducted in
private45 to prevent competitors from using information gathered
against the company under investigation and to avoid tainting the
reputation of any innocent party.46 In that year the Commission held
its first public investigation. 47 Others have followed. The Commission,
however, continues to hold many of its investigative hearings in private
and appears to decide on an ad hoc basis which kind of hearing to
hold. Only 20% of the firms investigated publicly are later prosecuted. 48
The survey revealed that small businesses are subjected to public
investigation more often than large ones, and that small firms appear
to suffer more from the adverse publicity that sometimes follows the
hearing.49 For example, small firms reported more injury than did large
firms resulting from public accusations against officers.5 0 This result
(1957); Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. (1951); 1'TC v.
Hallmark Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959).
41. See FTC v. Hallmark Inc., supra; FTC v. Bowman, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957);
FTC v. Tuttle, supra.
42. See 16 C.F.R.§ 1.36(b) (Supp. 1965).
43. 16 C.F.R. § 1.36 (Supp. 1965). There is no right to cross examine, to produce evl-
dence, etc.
44. 16 C.F.R. § 1.36(b)(4) (Supp. 1965). See Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 257
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
45. See, 16 C.F.R. § 1.41 (Supp. 1964); 24 ANT'rusr & TRADE REG. RE'. A-9, 10 (1961).
46. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,117 (1963). Adequate publicity results, of course, If and
when the wrongdoer is brought before the Commission for an adjudicatory hearing.
Baum and Baker, Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance and the FTC, 38 IND. L.J. 32 (1960).
47. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,117 (1963).
48. Compare 3 TRADE REG. RE . 10,367 (FTC investigations) with 3 TRADE REG. Ra,.
25,021-25,502 (dockets of complaint). The survey substantiated what a careful examina-
tion of the Trade Regulation Reporter shows-many are investigated but few are prose-
cuted.
49. The Commission puts out releases on all cases and investigations. Baum and Baker,
supra note 47, at 340.
50. The question was, "Did officers of your firm suffer personally from bad publicity?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 5 201 below $2,000,000
2. 4 18 annual sales
3. 10 15 above $2,000,000
4. 10 15 annual sales
"Did the personal accusations hurt your sales?"
[Vol. 75:487
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seems natural since large firms often have institutional images unrelated
to any particular officer. Moreover, small firms could not repair their
images as easily by firing the officer since he was more probably a
substantial owner.5a In highly fragmented industries many small firms
complained that their competitors used these public accusations to seek
businessY2 Large firms did not make similar complaints, apparently
because their markets are more stable and because their customers
would have considered such tactics bad form. The public hearing also
exposes information which is normally guarded closely by small firms.











15 5 annual sales
See, What Makes the Trust-Busters Run: Where Are They Going, 59 NEWswr. Ap. 23,
1962, pp. 76, 77.
51. The question asked was, "Were officers later proven involved in the illegal activity
fired?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 25 3) below $2,000,000
2. 26 5 annual sales
3. 4 191 above $2,000,000
4. 4 17 annual sales
"If not, why not? Were they major stockholders?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 16 3) below ' 2,000,000
2. 10 8 annual sales
3. 10 61 above $2,000,000
4. 9 6 f annual sales
52. The question asked was, "Did your competitors take advantage of that publicity
(derived from the hearings) against you?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 20 2) below $2,000,000
2. 15 4 annual sales
3. 6 14) above $2,000,000
4. 4 201 annual sales
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The Commission has justified public hearings on the grounds that
they enlighten the public, uncover "information of value," and reveal
violations. 3 However, only the first ground justifies a public, rather
than a private, hearing. And the public, it would seem, can be ade-
quately enlightened by adjudicatory hearings, which are held after a
complaint is issued.5 4 In one case 5 in which the Commission's power
to hold public hearings was questioned in court, the Commission
revealed a lack of confidence in its justifications. There the Commission
terminated proceedings55 rather than respond to charges that the hear-
ing violated constitutional rights of the investigated party.57 The Com-
mission should follow its better instincts and discontinue the use of
public hearings.
SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a determination that a violation has occurred, a case may
be settled or litigated. One method of settlement is "on an informal
nonadjudicatory basis. ' 58 This informal settlement might be merely
an oral understanding. It is not made public since, officially, only an
investigation of facts has been made, and there exists no Commission
complaint to settle. 0 In making such determinations to settle, the
Commission claims that it:
will consider (a) the nature and gravity of the alleged violation;
(b) the prior record and good faith of the parties involved; and
(c) other factors, including, where appropriate, adequate assurances
that the practice has been discontinued and will not be resumed.00
53. See 3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,114; Hall v. Lemke, 1962 TRADE CS. 70,388 (N.D.
Ill.).
54. 16 C.F.R. § 3.15-3.20 (Supp. 1965).
55. 3 TRADE RE. RP. 1 10,114; 1962 TRADE CAS. 70,338 (N.D. ILL.).
56. 3 TRADE REG. Rn. 10,114.
57. Archer v. Lemke, 1962 TRADE CAS. 1 70,417, Archer v. Lemke (N.D. 111.); Hall v.
Lemke, 1962 TRADE CAS. 70,338 (N.D. Ill.). Respondents in these cases contended they
had full right to counsel similar to those granted in private hearings. See Wanderer v.
Kaplan, 1962 TRADE CAs. 1 70,535 (D.D.C.), in which the court ruled that the procedural
safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005, ap.
plied equally to investigative as well as adjudicative proceedings. See Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420 (1960), for some of the limits to this right, and FCC v. Schreiber, 201 F.
Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962). See Note, 72 YALE LJ. 1227 (1963).
58. 16 C.F.R. § 1.21 (Supp. 1965).
59. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 9733. See 1952 FTC ANN. REP. 53.
60. 16 C.F.R. § 1.21 (Supp. 1965). Though this regulation was first promulgated in
1963, the 1961 FTC ANN. REP. states at 25:
The Commission closed 892 investigations [during the year]. Most of those were
closed because the investigations disclosed no basis for corrective action. However, 216
were closed upon receipt of assurances of discontinuance of the questioned practices,
and 67 were closed because the practice had been abandoned before the investigation
got underway and it did not appear that the practice would be resumed.
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There exist a second, more formal, method of settlement. Prior to the
issuance of a formal complaint, the Commission sends to the party
a proposed consent order.," If, within ten days,6- the party notifies the
Commission of its willingness to agree to a consent order, it then has
thirty days in which to attempt to negotiate different terms for the
order.03 The Commission, however, never agrees to partial settlements;
the party may not choose to admit some violations and to litigate others.
If the party finally agrees to an order, it is released to the public. By
agreeing he waives his right to question the Commission's jurisdiction"
or to seek appeal in the courts, 5 and he promises to cease performance
of the acts specified in the order. If the party later breaks the promise,
he is subject to the same sanctions which the Commission could employ
if a respondent violated a cease and desist order filed after an adjudica-
tory hearing.66 If the party does not consent, a formal complaint is
filed and an adjudicatory hearing is begun.27
The survey demonstrated that the more favorable, informal and
private method of settlement is used with large firms more often than
with smaller firms.6 In fact, 90% of the firms with less than $2,000,000
61. 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (Supp. 1965).
62. 16 C.F.R. § 2.2(a) (Supp. 1965).
63. 16 CY.R. § 2A(a) (Supp. 1965).
64. 16 C.F.RL § 2.3 (Supp. 1965).
65. Ibid.
66. Even after the consent order is negotiated, the Commission has the option of ac-
cepting or rejecting the order, or taking "such other action as it may deem appropriate."
16 C.F.R. § 2A(b)(3) (Supp. 1965). Presumably, this includes sending both parties back to
the bargaining table to get an order more agreeable to the Commission. The Commission
itself might suggest modifications which would make the order more acceptable to it. If
the Division of Consent Orders feels agreement is unlikely between the respondent and
itself on what it considers proper terms it can turn the matter over to the Commission
which can "take such action as may be appropriate." 16 C.F.R. § 2A(c) (Supp. 1965).
Again, this would presumably allow further negotiations whether or not the thirty da)s
had run. There is no indication, however, that the Commission has used this wide lati-
tude afforded it; rather, it appears, they have stuck fairly rigidly to the thirty day re-
striction.
67. 16 C.F.R. § 2.2(b) (Supp. 1965).
68. The question asked was, "When threatened with prosecution by the FTC did
you settle with the Commission?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 5 26 ' below $2,000,000
2. 5 25 annual sales
3. 9 16 above *2,000,000
4. 15 16 annual sales
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in gross sales did not realize that informal settlement procedures ex-
isted.69
There are several reasons why the Commission might deal with large
firms more informally: The Commission may find it easier to supervise
informal settlements with large firms since they are often more visible
than small firms. Or it may be that large firms more faithfully honor
their informal settlements. Or the Commission might consider the
relative likelihood that the firm will litigate aggressively. For example,
the study found 90%o of the firms with gross sales of more than
$2,000,000 were unconcerned about the cost of litigation when they
felt they had a good case. In marked contrast, 90% of the firms with
gross sales less than $2,000,000 feared the cost of litigation even when
they felt they had a good case.70 Only the first two justifications would
be legitimate. The last, based on the litigating ability of the firm,
would confer substantial advantage to firms solely on the basis of
financial capacity. If there are real explanations of the present proce-
dures, the Commission should articulate them and apply them on a
non-discriminatory basis.
APPENDIX A
The following were the questions asked on the questionnaire.
Statistical breakdown of the answers appears in the footnotes where the
69. The question asked was, "Did you know this option (informal settlement) was
open to you?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 3 28 below $2,000,000
2. 3 27 ' annual sales
3. 17 16' above $2,000,000
4. 25 7 annual sales
70. The question asked was, "Did you fear high costs of litigation (when deciding on
what legal action to take in relation to the FTC proposed complaint)?"
Quarter Yes No
1. 29 3 ' below $2,000,000
2. 30 2 ( annual sales
. 4 33 above $2,000,000
4. 3 30 annual sales
The costs of litigation are extremely high. One figure suggested as the cost for litigation
before the Commission is $175,000. (Dixon, supra note 32, at 49 n.64.) Even if this figure
were halved it would make litigation burdensome for any firm with sales less than
$2,000,000. In one case ten million dollars was spent by several firms over three years for
a defense. Anderson, Effective Antitrust Compliance Programs and Procedures, 18 Bus.
LAwYER 739 (1963).
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What is the nature of your business?
How would you characterize your industry? A few large firms which
dominate the market? A mixture of large and small firms or many
small firms in a highly competitive market?
Additional comments?
Have you ever written a letter to the Commission complaining of the
activities of a supplier? competitor? or customer?
What was the nature of the complaint?
How many complaints have you written?
Did increases of the number of complaints coincide with a downturn
in business?
Did you write often about one firm or did you complain about the
activities of many firms?
Did the Commission ask for further details by a visit or letter?
If not, did they give any explanation for their action or lack of action?
Was the violation a grave and obvious one or did you merely suspect
some violation might have occurred?
Were you ever reluctant to complain to the Commission about the
activities of another firm because you felt that they would retaliate
in the course of business?
Was this firm larger or smaller than yours?
What reasons were you given for the FTC's refusal to follow-up a
complaint? The firm complained about was too small? The activity
was not illegal? The case against the firm was too difficult to prove
and win? Was the firm you complained about a direct competitor of
the same size as your firm? Considerably larger? Smaller?
How did your firm first learn it was under investigation by the FTC
due to a complaint of another? Letter? or did a FTC investigator
just drop by your offices?
How much advance warning did you have?
Did the notice tell you specifically what you were being investigated
for and what information the FTC wanted from you?
Did you know that you had a legal right not to answer any questions
or give up any documents until subpoenaed?
Did your own counsel or the FTC investigator tell you of this right?
Who did the FTC investigator first see in the firm?
How often has your firm been investigated by the FTC?
Did FTC investigators change their approach with each successive
investigation? How?
Has a subpoena been used to get information from you?
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What sorts of information have been required?
Have you ever been involved in a public investigation by the Commis-
sion?
Did a prosecution of your firm arise from that investigation?
What sort of information was required from you for the public hear-
ing?
Were your competitors also questioned at this hearing?
Was the same sort of information required from them?
Wid you find the information brought up in the hearing about your
competitors useful to you?
Do you think your competitors found information gotten by them
about you in the public hearings useful in their competition against
you?
Can you substantiate this belief?
Did bad publicity result from the hearings? for you? for your com-
petitor?
Were unwarranted accusations against your firm made?
Was the information asked in the form of direct testimony, documents,
or answers to questionnaires?
Did officers of your firm suffer personally from bad publicity?
Did the personal accusations hurt your sales?
Were officers later proven involved in the illegal activity fired?
If not, why not? Were they stockholders?
Did the Commission use the publicity as a form of punishment against
you?
When threatened with prosecution by the FTC did you settle in-
formally with the Commission? Did you know this option was open
to you?
If you tried and failed why did you fail?
What were your total legal fees for this type of settlement if you used
it?
Why did you choose this method of action? Did you know you had
violated the law? Did you fear high costs of litigation?
If you used this method of settlement and your competitors were not
prosecuted for engaging in the same acts did the failure of the FTC
to prosecute your competitors hurt your sales?
Did you settle by the use of a consent decree? Did you know this
method was available to you? Who told you, the FTC or your own
counsel?
Did the settlement by the use of consent decree actually involve some
negotiations with the FTC or did they demand acceptance of terms
on their grounds?
Why did you use the consent decree procedure? High cost of litigation?
Possibility of bad publicity if you litigated? Knew you had violated
the law? Fear of the triple damage suit if you litigated and lost?
Did you know no consent decree could be negotiated after a complaint
issued? Who informed you of this? Your counsel or the FTC?
Would you have begun litigation if consent decrees were available
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after a complaint issued? Why? Would you like this procedure better?
Why?
What were legal costs as a result of settlement this way?
Were your competitors engaged in the same activities?
Did the FTC fail to prosecute them for this?
Was your business injured as a result?
Did you litigate? What were legal costs? Did you win?
Were your competitors engaged in similar practices?
Were they prosecuted by the Commission? If not, was your firm injured
because your competitors could carry on the same activity?
What other criticisms of the FTC do you have?
The materials collected in this survey are deposited at the Yale Law
Library.
